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The Space Shuttle has its roots in a number of studies and programs dating back to the early
1940's. The first of these was the A-tO, a V-2 derivative proposed as a winged hypersonic glide
bomber capable of reaching the east coast of the United States when launched from Germany. After
World War If, similar studies were conducted in the United States as secret Air Force programs named
ROBO and Brass Bell. These studies evolved into the Dynasoar program of the mid lg50's. Dynasoar
went through various phases and missions. By 1957, O)_asoar was proposed as a'manned orbiting vehi-
cle capable of reuse after landing. A conference of National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA) experts in all of the aeronautical research disciplines was convened at the NACA A_es Research
Laboratory in October 1957 to review the feasibility of such a program. This group concluded that al-
though there were many difficult engineering research and development problems to be solved, there
were no fundamental reasons why such a vehicle could not be successfully developed. Dynasoar, for
various reasons, was not immediately funded. It was later revived on a smaller scale and then can-
celed.
The NASA manned and unmanned space program had i_tsbeginnings at that conference even though
NASA was not formed until a year later. There were serious discussions between various factions at
the conference on the desirability of basing a manned orbital vehicle on the supersonic and hyper-
sonic research airplane technology being developed at Edwards Air Force Base or on ballistic missile
launch vehicle and reentry technology. There were also serious discussions about starting an all-
solid-propellant launch vehicle to compete with the Vanguard Program.
The ballistic missile launch vehicle and reentry technology approach was studied in detail by a
small group of engineers a£ the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division of the NACA Langley Research Cen-
ter for the year following the conference. The same group did detailed studies and planning on a
four-stage solid-propellant vehicle capable of placing small satellites in orbit. These studies were
thorough enough to become the basis for Project Mercury and the Scout missile with the creation of
NASA in October 1958. Project Mercury was successful, cost effective, and completed on a relatively
short schedule because it bypassed all of the different engineering research and development problems
associated with Dynasoar and utilized existing ballistic missile launch vehicle and reentry technol-
ogy. The Scout program was successful because it was based on 15 years of small solid-propellant
launch vehicle technology developed at Wallops Island.
Unmanned space operations used liquid-propellant launch vehicles such as Redstone, Thor, Atlas,
and Titan, and their uprated derivatives. These launch vehicles had been rendered surplus by the in-
troduction of smaller solid-propellant systems such as Pershing, Polaris, and Minuteman. The smaller
solid-propellant systems were not capable of launching large satellites or manned vehicles into -
orbit. The number of surplus large liquid-propellant launch vehicles was limited, and there were no
active production lines or programs to replace them. The Saturn V production line was shut down
before completion of the Apollo Program. In the early-lg70's, the future of manned and unmanned
space programs looked bleak. _
While the Apollo Program was winding down,, some of the same engineers who started Project
Mercury along with veterans of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo missions began an in-house study of a reus-
able manned operational vehicle which could handle all the foreseen manned and unmanned space launch
requirements. The vehicle was, in essence, a large upgraded version of Dynasoar with a different
mission. Many things had happened since the D_asoar proposal of'1957. Mercury, Gemini, Saturn,
Apollo, X-15, manned reentry body research programs, and new ballistic missile systems had spawned
advances in structures, materials, fabrication, processing, propulsion, aerod_amics, avionics,
communications, guidance and navigation, and other technologies not available to Dynasoar in 1957. A
reusable spacecraftdld not seem so difficult any more. The initial reaction was to recover every-
thing possible and to design both the booster and the orbiter around existing Saturn-Apollo technol-
ogy. The vehlcle was sized to accommodate the largest existing known payloads of the time.
Evolution from the original vehicle size and configuration to the present Shuttle wac not easy.
The number of different concepts, configurations, designs, payload weights and volumes, and opera-
tional requirements was unlimited, and everyone in the government and industry aerospace business had
a legitimate reason for wanting a specific vehicle size and configuration to be selected. There were
serious differences in philosophy regarding the cost effectiveness of using existing technology as
opposed to tying the success of the program to promising, new, sophisticated but unproven technology.
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Propulsion and power subsystems usually constitute B5 to 90 percent of the weight and volume of
the entire system and have a profound effect on the overall launch vehicle size and configuration.
Programmatic requirements and factors also have a significant effect on the overall propulsion system
design and configuration. Some of these factors and requirements are shown in figure 1. The program
requirements will generally be responsible for sizing the propulsion and power systems and establish-
ing minimum system requirements. The program factors affect the selection of the configuration and
have a strong influence on component design. The interaction between these factors is so complex
that it defies any logical explanation or comment, and the success of the Shuttle is the result of
hundreds of wise technical and management decisions that would have challenged Solomon.
When the Shuttle requirements wore better defined and management decisions were made concern-
ing the relative importance of some of the factors, the process of selecting one of the various
configurations, design concepts, and system components from the many available options was started.
Some of the more serious configuration options are presented in figure 2. Each of these was the sub-
ject of extensive contractor and government studies. The configuration option selected is enclosed
by a rectangle.
Single stage to orbit is the goal or ideal of every space vehicle designer. Unfortuflately, ex-
tremely low structural and subsystem weight fractions are required to keep the vehicle size manage-
able, and predictable high propulsion system performance is required. Very mall percentage of
weight growth or reduction in propulsion system perfomaqce in the course of vehicle development
could result in negative payload margins. Commitment to a single-stage-to-orbit concept did not ap-
pear worth the risk. The integral propellant tank would result in a very large orbiter, and there
was no experience in recovery of eggshell tanks reentering from orbital activities over a dispersed
area. A recoverable drop-tank option is a possibility for future operations.
When boosting an aerodynamic vehicle with a large lifting surface in one plane, tandem booster
arrangements produce extremely high structural bending loads and high control-moment requirements.
Experience in launching many airplane configurations at Wallops Island in the IgSO's showed that
piggyback arrangements with parallel staging could alleviate this problem. Parallel staging of mall
solid-propellant launch vehicles was also developed at Wallops Island in the ig50's and successfully
applied to the Delta and Titan programs on a much larger scale. An as)mBetrlc piggyback configura-
tion with large lifting surfaces in one plane and dual propulsion systems located above and below the
center of gravity having different and varying thrust levels with large shifts in the vertical center
of gravity is a control system nightmare.
A serious proposal was made to locate the Space Shuttle main engines (SSME's) aft on the exter-
nal tank and to transport the engines into an empty payload bay using permanently attached mechanical
arms. Such an arrangement could, it was reasoned, more easily track the center of gravity shifts as
propellant was expended, reduce the overall required control authority, ano possibly use a fixed-
nozzle solid rocket booster (SRB).
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
• PAYLOAD WEIGHT
• PAYLOAD VOLUME
• ORBIT ALTITUDE AND INCLINATION
• ON ORBIT OPERATIONS
PROGRAM FACTORS
• TRAFFIC MODELS
• REUSABILITY AND REFURBISHMENT
• MAINTAINABILITY
• GROUND OPERATIONS
• TURNAROUND .'
• PRODUCTION COSTS
• OPERATIONS COST
• MANUFACTURING, TEST AND LAUNCH SITES
• SCHEDULE
FIGURE 1.- PROGRAMREQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAM
FACTORS.
• NUMBER OF STAGES
• SINGLE STAGE TO ORBIT
• PRC)PELLANT TANK
• INTEGRAL WITH ORBITER
• IEXTERNAL - NON-REGOVERABLE I
• EXTERNAL - RECOVERABLE
• BOOSTER ORBITER ARRANGEMENT
• TANDEM STAGING
• )PARALLEL STAGING (PIGGYBACK)I
• ORBITER MAIN ENGINE LOCATION
• AFT ON ORBITER
• AFT ON EXTERNAL TANK (SWING ENGINE)
FIGURE 2.- CONFIGURATI_ OPTIONS.
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Many of the reasonable propulsion and power system options considered are presented in figures
3 to 8 without comment. The selected options generally used existing military or Saturn-Apollo tech-
nology except where these systems would not permit reuse or where the system or component performance
could not be easily upgraded to Shuttle requirements. Some of the reasons Which led to selection of
a spectfjc destgn or concept and factors which contributed to successful development and operation of
the system in a cost-effective manner are discussed in other papers in this session. Each reader can
determine whether he thinks the selected approache_ were cost effective and were indeed the best
choice. No Justification for the choices is necessary as the success of the program to date provides
conftmatton that options selected are adequate.
Some of the work is still unfinished. The Shuttle must yet demonstrate the originally ad-
vertised payload capability and turnaround time. Costs per launch must be reduced. There is lit-
tle or no growth available in the existing propulsion and power systems without major redesign.
There are, however, many system design features to take care of problems with low probability of oc-
currence and areas of excessive'redundancy and design margins which have been incorporated into the
program at the expense of payloads.
For the first time, there will be a small fleet of operational vehicles which will fly •any mis-
sions and provide the necessary operational experience and a data base to eliminate the difference be-
tween real and imagined performance and design requirements. The existence of this data base alone
should result in substantial increases in payload capability. This data base will also provide infor-
mation to eliminate unnecessary design complexity, design margins, redundancy, and excessive estimate
of propellant requirements for enhanced versions of the Shuttle and future space transportation
systems.
• LIQUID PROPELLANT
• LOX-H2
• LOX-HYDROCARBON
• EARTH STORABLE
• FLYBACK - REUSABLE
• BIG DUMB BOOSTER
• ISOLID PROPELLANT I
• NONRECOVERABLE
• IRECOVERABLE I
• CASE
• MONOLITHIC
.F_
• FILAMENT WOUND
FIGURE 3.- BOOSTER OPTIONS.
• ORBITER MAIN ENGINE (SSME) -
• J-2, J2-S
• NEW HIGH PRESSURE GAS GENERATOR'
• IH@QH PRESSURE STAGED COMBUSTIONI
• AEROSPIKE
• ORBITAL MANEUVERING ENGINE
• RL-10
• LOX-HYDROCARBON
• IEARTH STORABLEI
- COOUNG
e,ABLATION
- FEED SYSTEM
• PUMP FED
FIGURE 4.- ORBITER PROPULSION OPTIONS.
• TVC
• NONE
• LIQUID INJECTION
• IGIMBALLED NOZZLE)
• THRUST TERMINATION
,lk-61
• YES
• PROPELLANT
• HTPB
• OTHER
FIGURE 3.- CONCLUDED.
• MOUNTING
• INTEGRAL WITH VEHICLE
• IEXTERNAL POD MOUNT I
• PROPELLANT ACQUISITION
• GRAVITY-THRUST SETTLING
• ICAPILLARY SCREENS I
FIGURE 5.- ORBITER MANEUVERING SYSTEM OPTIONS.
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• PROPELLANT
• GASEOUS O2-H2
• LOX-LH2
• LOX-HYDROCARBON
• IEARTH STORABLE I
• MONOPROPELLANT
• INSTALLATION
• FIXED
• IREMOVABLE POD OR MODULE I
• TANKS
• BLADDERS
• OTHER POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT
• ICAPILLARY SCREENS I
• VALVES
• SOLENOID
• ILINE PRESSURE ACTUATED I
FIGURE 6.- REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM OPTIONS.
(1) HYDROGEN-OXYGEN
(2) EARTH STORABLE BIPROPELLANT
(3) LOX-HYDROCARBON
(4) _MONOPROPELLANT I
• POWER (SPEED) CONTROL
(1) PRESSURE MODULATION
(2) iPULSE MODULATION]
• PYROTECHNIC SYSTEMS
• NO
FIGURE 7.- AUXILIARY POWERUNIT OPTIONS.
(1) TURBINE - ALTERNATOR
(2) BATTERIES
(3))FUEL CELLS]
-  -grel
- ACIDIC
(4) SOLAR CELLS
• REACTANT STORAGE SYSTEM
• ISUPERCRITICAL STORAGE I
• SUBCRITICAL STORAGE
FIGURE 8.- ELECTRICAL POWER OPTIONS.
Another reason for presenting the various propulsion and power system options without comment is
that the issues are not yet settled. In the past years, numerous studies of enhanced or next genera-
tion space transportation system were based on many of the options originally rejected, as well as
on such new propulsion concepts as the dual fueled engine. Remembering that it was 15 years between
the Dynasoar of 1957 and the Shuttle, and that 10 years have already elapsed since the Shuttle design
concepts converged, it is not unreasonable to assume that new information or technology is or will be
available which would result in selection of an entirely n_ concept or design, or one originally
rejected, when future Space Transportation Systeew_(STS) programs are undertaken. The propulsion and
power system used technology from Department of Defense (DOD) programs, Saturn, Apollo, and some
developed concurrently with the Shuttle. The success of the Shuttle program to date speaks for it-
self. Unfortunately, with the introduction of solid-propellant rockets into the ballistic missile
program, recent emphasis on cruise missiles, and assignment of responsibility for all space transpor-
tation to NASA, DOD is no longer funding the large liquid-propellant technology programs which have
benefited NASA in the past.
Lack of funding of new technology, cancellation of old launch vehicle programs, ar,dno new
production in sight threatens the existence of old line companies capable of developing and man-
ufacturing the propulsion system required for future space transportation systems. If new tech-
nology programs with substantial funding are not forthcoming soon,-there may not be a single
surviving company capable of conducting new technology and development and production programs
required to suc_port the Space Transportation System. The responsibility is now _A's and the
future of propulsion and power technology rests solely in the hands of NASA management.
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